E>oeg more leverage always wcfsen tbe debt ageocy problem? This paper ptesents a unified analysis that acconntB for both risk-shifting and nixler-iiivestiiient ddbt agency problems. For firms with positive marginal volatility of investment (defined as the change in cash flow volatility cone^ponding to a change of itwestment scale), equity holders' risk-shifting incentive will midgate the under-investment problem. This inqdies that, cotUrary to ccmventional views, the total agency cost of debt does not unifcsmly increase with leverage. This model fiiither predicts tbat, for Mg^ growth firms in which the under-investment problem is severe, the optimal debt ratio is positively related to the marginal volatility of investmenL Empirical results suppmt this prediction.
I. Introduction
Two principal debt agency problems have been identified in the literature. One is the risk-shifting or asset substitution problem, first identified by Jensen and Meckling (1976) . In their views, equity can be seen as a call option on the firm and call values increase with the volatility of the underlying asseL This creates an incentive for equity holders to shift the firm's investments into high risk projects. The other is the under-investment incentive. Myeis (1977) argues that, when a firm's leverage increases, equity holdeis have an incentive to under-invest in positive net present value (NPV) projects. This occurs because equity bolders bear the costs of investment but capture only part of the net benefit, and the rest accrues to bond holders. Rational (tebt holders arc aware of the equity holders' incentives to shift risk and under-invest, thereby pricing the debt accordingly and demanding a higher rate of retum. ITius, the adverse consequences of debt agency problems are entirely bome by the equity holders themselves dnough the increased cost of debt financing.
The implications of debt agency problems for an optimal c^tal structure have been widely studied in the litraature. In their seminal p^)er, Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose that a firm's optimal debt-equity ratio is achieved by equating the marginal agency cost of debt and the marginal agency cost of equity. This theory assumes that the agency cost of debt increases monotonically with the amount of leverage the firm employs.' The relationship between die leverage ratio and debt agency cost has been explored by several studies, but previous research typically focuses on only one type of the debt agesacy ixoblem, either the risk-shifting or the under-investment problem. Gavish and Kalay (1983) adopt a very simple one-period model to examine the relationship between leverage and the severity of the risk-shifting problem. They argue that equity holders' riskshifting incentive is not an increasing function of the leverage ratio. Green and Talmor (1986) restate the problem in a similar model context, and find that Gavish and Kalay's original conclusion is a misinterpretation of the result. Their study suggests diat more debt aggravates shareholders' incentive to take risk. This is consistent with the original conjecture of Jensen and Meckling. Similarly, Myers (1977) also demonstrates a positive relationship between leverage and the agency cost of under-investmenL Given the properties of the risk-shifting and under-investment problems examined in isolation, it is often asserted that mare levraage exacerbates the debt agency problem. Such an assertion assumes that the two debt agency problems drive firms' investment decisions in the same direction, and n^lects the potential interaction between the two. Suppose that the volatility of a firm's cash fiows increases with investment scale, or that a firm faces a potential project with cash fiows positively correlated with the cash fiows from its existing assets. In this case, increasing the scale of investment would increase the total volatility of the firm's cash flows, in a leveraged firm, equity holders would increase investment to increase firm risk, while their under-investment incentives discourage them from investing. Therefore, the two incentive problems will affect the firm's investment and debt policy in different directions.
The potential interaction between the under-investment problem and the riskshifting incentive has not been completely ignored. Myers (1977) points out that, if investment increases the variance of project return, equity holders' incentive to shift risk wiU mitigate the under-investment problem. He concludes: "The impact of risky debt on the market value of the firm is less for firms holding investment options on assets that are risky relative to the firms' present assets. In this sense we may observe risky firms borrowing more than safe ones" (Myers (1977), p. 167). Myers' argument suggests a positive relationship between the optimal debt level and business risk. Despite several attempts to test this idea, however, the empirical evidence is ambiguous (e.g., see Long and Malitz (1985) , Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984) , and Titman and Wessels (1988)). I argue that 'As Jensen and Meckling comment. "We are fairly confident of our arguments regarding the signs of the first derivatives of the functions ..." (Jensen and Meckling (1976), p. 3A6). Here "the functions" refer to the debt agency cost function and the equity agency cost function.
this is because the interaction between the two debt agency problems has not been fully understood.
To address this lack, I develop a simple model that captures both the dskshifting and the under-investment problems. In the model, a firm faces a discretionary investment decision, and the terminal firm value is a random variable whose mean and volatility both depend on the size of the irrvestmenL Thus the risk-shifting and under-investment incentives will affect the investment decision of a leverage firm in the same or different direction, and the total agency cost of debt will depend on the tradeoff between the two incentive problems.
A key result of the model is that, if the volatility of project cash flows increases with investment scale, risk-shifting by equity holders will mitigate the under-investment problem. This implies that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the total agency cost of debt is not monotonically increasing with leverage. Furthermore, the model predicts a unique relationship between the optimal debt level and the marginal volatility of investment (MVI), which I define as die change of cash fiow volatility corresponding to a change of iavestment scale. For high growth firms, the optijnal level of debt increases with the magnitude of MVI when MVI is positive, but declines with the magnitude of MVI when MVI is negative. It suggests a positive relationship between the optimal debt level and MVI. For low growth firms, the optimal level of debt decreases with the magnitude of MVI for botii positive and negative MVI firms. It suggests a negative relationship between the optimal debt level and MVI when MVI is positive, and a positive relationship between the optimal debt level and MVI when MVI is negative. I test the model's predictions using cross-sectional data from Compustat (1976 Compustat ( -1995 . Empirical findings support these predictions. For high growth firms, I find a significant positive relationship between leverage and MVL For low growth firms, I observe a significandy negative relationship between leverage and MVI when MVI is positive, and a weakly positive relationship between the two when MVI is negative.
The paper is organized as follows. Section n presents a one-period discretetime model that captures both the risk-shifting and under-investment problems. Section ni reviews and interprets empirical tests and results. Section IV concludes the paper.
IL The Model
I examine the effects of leverage on a firm's investment decision in a oneperiod discrete-time model. Ib higjilight the central canfiicts of interest between equity holders and bond holders, I abstract from many important influences on financial decisions, such as risk aversion, dividend policy, taxes, agency costs of equity, and deadweight costs of bankruptcy. The model, which allows for a simultaneous analysis of the Hsk-shifting and under-investment pn^lems, is described by the following assumptions: i) Equity holders control the firm, and the managerial objective is to maximize the value of equity.î i) lliere are no taxes or bankmptcy costs, and there is no infonnation asymmetry between insiders and outside investors. iii) Investment policy cannot be established (or specified) contractually ex arrte, iv) All economic agents are risk neutral, and the risk-fiee rate is zero. v) Investment decisions are made at time 0, and the firm liquidates at time 1, Consider a firm with a single investment prqjecL Let (1) *i = is the end-of-periodcash flow at time 1, which is also the terminal value of the firm; Jko measures the investment scale and is chosen by equity holders at time 0; £i is a random variable that represents the state of nature at time 1 resulting fiom randomness in technology, in the prices of inputs and outputs, and in the demand fodng the firm, I assume that ei is a random variable with continuous density function/(£i), a mean of zero, and a variance of one. Given equation (1), the terminal firm value, j^i, is a random variable whose mean and volatility both depend on the initial investment, ito-1^ ensure limited liability for equity holders, I assume that .^i = ^(ifco) + <T(ko)ei > 0 fbr all £i and ko. This implies that where £* is the low bound of £i.
I assume that the mean function of the firm's cash fiows, ju(iko)> is a twice continuously differentiable function with ii'(ko) > 0 and ii"{ko) < 0. TUs is consistent with many types of technologies, such as a Cobb-Douglas production function. I assume that (T{ko) is once differentiable in ito, a°d I call its first derivative [o''(Jto)] the marginal volatility of investment (MVI). The sign on a'(ito) is unrestricted, since it may differ across firms or industries. In fact, the relationship between the volatility of cash fiows and the investment scale may dqwnd on a firm's investment opportunity set and the stochastic driving forces of cash fiows.
I assume that, before time 0, the firm issues equity and debt to raise capital for investment in the project Suppose it issues zero-coupon bonds that have a total face value of D and mature at time 1. As I have assumed above, monitoring and bonding costs exclude die possibility of contracting equity holders to a particular ito ex ante. Therefore, at time 0, for a given level of debt, D, equity holders would invest ito units of capital so as to maximize the net present value of their claims. â n important assumption to cast tbe cooflicts of interest between equity holders and debt holders. In feet, managers may pursue their own interests instead of those of eqtiity holders. There are numerous studies of the agency costs of managerial discretion, e.g., Stulz (1990) . Along another line of the research on optimal capital stmcttire under asymmetric infbrmaticn, Dj^nvig and Zender (1991) argue that the optimal choice cf managerial compensation contract may resolve the ctnflicts of interest among different classes of stakeholders of firm. These are interesting issues, hut beyond the scope of ^hJK study.
As in Myers (1977), Long and Malitz (1985), Brander and Lewis (1986), and Kim and Malcsimovic (1990), the debt level is [nedetermiiied cr exo^nously given at the time the investment decision Required capital outlay is [noportional to the size of investment, Coko, where Co is the unit cost of c^tal.*^ If the proceeds from the sale of securities in the first place are less than the required capital outlay, the firm could issue more equity at time 0. On the contrary, if the proceeds are larger than the costs of investment, the firm could pay out the diffeience as a dividend at time 0.
A. Debt Agency Problems and Investment Policy
To demonstrate how debt agency problems influence investment policy, I evaluate the investment decision, i^o. fiist for an all-equity firm, and then for a leveraged firm. Equation (4) suggests that optimal investment is achieved at the point where the marginal retum on investment equals its marginal cosL Given that /x"(Ab) < 0, there is a unique value of itg that maximizes the NPV of the firm.
Leveraged Rrm
In a leveraged firm, the objective of equity holders is to select an investment policy, k^, that will maximize the net present value of their equity claims, ENPV(io), The first-order condition leads to an investment policy in a levraaged firm, which is detennined by the following.
Tb determine how the level of debt in a firm affects equity holders' investment policy, I totally differentiate equation (6) and get
Assuming that the second-order condition fbr an interior optimum is satisfied, the denominator on the right-hand side of (7) is negative. Thus, the sign of dk^/dD is the same as the sign of the cross-partial derivative in the numerator. Tkldng d«ivatives on both sides of equation (6) . This tenn creates a negative relation between leverage and investment policy. All else equal, the higher is Co, the stronger is the under-investment incentive. This is because when Co is high, the increasing debt level, D, will reduce more investment in jfeg. As a result, the sign of idk^)/idD) wUl depend on the tradeoff between the two incentive problems.
I first consider that the volatility of project cash flows increases with investment scale, (r'ik^) > 0. As Appendix B proves and Figure 1 depicts, the risk-shifting incentive is dominant at a low level of debL Increases in leverage will initially lead the firm to over-invest, k^ > Ag. As the debt level rises, tbe under-investment incentive becomes more and more significant, and countervails the dsk-shifting problem, llius, the firm becomes less and less over-invested. At some high level of debt, tbe under-investment incentive dominates the firm's dsk-shifting decision, and a leveraged firm under-invests at a level k^ that is less than &g. If the value function of project cash fiows is well bdiaved, thne exists a positive level of debt, D*, at which these two incentives offset each other, and an optimal investment decision is achieved, Jbg=k^. Hie optimal level of debt, D*, at which neither an over-investment nor under-investment incentive is induced, can be determined by the following equation. Alternatively, if the volatility of cash flows declines or does not change with investment scale, eT'{k^) < 0, the risk-shifting incentive encourages a leveraged firm to under-invest (see Appendix B). Thus, b(^ the risk-shifting and the underinvestment problems influence the investment decision in the same way. The higho-the debt level, the more the firm under-invests.
B. Agency Cost of Debt
In an efBcient capital market, the adverse consequences of debt agency are borne entirely by equity holders through the increased cost of debt financing. Any deviations from firm value-maximizing policies will be reflected in a decline in the value of firm. Following the literature, the agency cost of debt (AC) is defined as the difference between the net present value of an all-equity firm and that of a leveraged firm. Thus, Because the risk-shifting incentive is dominant, the firm over-invests, and /i'(io) < Q-^ Thus, the agency cost of debt rises with the debt level, dAC/dD > 0. As the level of debt increases beyond a positive level of D", the total agency cost declines with leverage, dAC/dD < 0. At the optinoal debt level, D*, the two debt agency problems offset each other, and a valuemaximizing investment policy is adopted, Jtg = k^. Thas, the agency cost drops to zero. For a debt level higher than D*, equity holders' under-investment incentive becomes dominant, and a leveraged firm tends to invest less than the optimal. Hence, dAC/dD > 0, and the agency cost again becomes positive and rises with leverage. Figure 1 shows that this dynamic effect of leverage on agency cost is coincident with its influences on investment policy and the marginal retum of the bond. Unlike Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977), and Green and TUmor (1986), my study indicates that, for firms with positive marginal volatility of investment, a'ik^) > 0, the total agency cost of debt does not uniformly increase with the amount of leverage.
Appendix B also shows that firms with zero or negative marginal volatility of investment, tr'ik^) < 0, experience an under-investment problem at any positive level of debt. Hence, dAC/dD is positive, and the agency cost of debt increases monotonically with leverage. ' The over-investment problem here aiises fiom eqtnty bolden' risk-shifting incentive. This is different fiom the over-investment incentive discussed by (Stulz (1990) and Ii and Ii (1996)), which results from the agency costs of managerial discretion given that the manageis' perqtiisites increase with the size of investment
C. Marginal Volatility of Investment and Det>t Policy
The above analysis suggests a countervailing interaction between the two debt agency problems. This potential interaction has not gone unnoticed. Myers (1977) points out that, if investment raises the variance of project return, equity holders' incentive to shift risk will mitigate the under-investment problem. He concludes: "... we may observe hsky firms borrowing more than safe ones" (Myers ( In this model, the unit cost of coital, Co, represents the magnitude of the under-investment problem. As shown above, the higher is Co, the more likely a firm is to under-invesL This is because when Co is high, raising the debt level, D, will reduce more investment in k^. Proposition 1 implies that, for firms with a severe under-investment problem, the risk-shifting incentive alleviates the underinvestment problem, thereby reducing the total agency cost of debt financing.
Tbis is tbe simplest form of a volatility flinction, which differentiates itself fiom many previous studies tbat bave only examined tbe efTect of exogenous business riiik on corporate capital structure (Castanias (1983). Bradley. Jarrell. and Kim (1984). Kale. Noe, and Ramirez (1991)). It basically decomposes the riskincM of a project cash flow into two parts. One is tbe endogenous risk, wbich is proportional to tbe investment decision, i^: tiie other part represents exogenous risk due to market fluctuation that is unrelated to tbe investment decision.
Thus, such firms can toleiate more debt in their capital structure. For firms with few under-investment problems, however, the dominance of the risk-shifting incentive pushes the optimal capital structure to a comer solution, and the agency cost of debt uniformly rises with debt level. In such a scenario, the optimal debt level would be negatively related to the marginal volatility of investment Proposition 1 applies only to firms with positive marginal volatility of investment (MVI). As shown above, if MVI is negative or zero, the risk-shifting incentive leads equity holders to under-invest, and the agency cost of debt increases with the magnitude of MVI. Since the agency cost of debt and the optimal debt level move in opposite directions, the optimal debt level decreases with tbe magnitude of MVI.
Implication I. For firms with negative Tnnrginnl volatility of investment, the optimal debt level decreases with the magnitude of MVI.
III. Empirical Analysis
The above analysis suggests a unique empirical predicticm on the relationship of the optimal leverage and the marginal volatility of investment (MVI). This relationship depends on whether the under-investment problem is severe. In the agmcy literature, it has been well established that the higher is a firm's growth potential, the mare likely it is to under-invest. Therefore, I use a measure of growth potential to proxy for the degree of under-investmenL Based on Proposition 1 and Implication 1,1 propose the following testable hypothesis.
HI. For high growth firms, the optimal level of debt increases with the magnitude of MVI when MVI is positive, hut declines with the magnitude of MVI when MVI is negative. It suggests a positive relationship between the optimal debt level and MVI. For low growth firms, the optimal level of debt decreases with the magnitude of MVI fbr both positive and n^ative MVI firms. It suggests a negative relationship between the optimal debt level and MVI when MVI is positive, and a positive relationship between the optimal debt level and MVI when MVI is negative.
For high growth firms with a significant under-investment problem, the model suggests that the agency cost of debt will decrease with the magnitude of MVI if the MVI is positive, but increase with the magnitude of MVI if the MVI is n^a-tive. This is because the under-investment and risk-shifting incentives offiset each other in the farrstsx case. For low growth firms where under-investment is likely to be insignificant, the agency cost of debt will increase with the magnitude of MVI for both positive and negative MVI firms, since the risk-shifting problem is the dominant agency problem generated by debt in this case. Since the agency cost of debt and the optimal dd)t level move in opposite directions, for high growth firms, the optimal debt level will rise with the magnitude of MVI when MVI is positive, but decline with the magnitude of MVI when MVI is negative. For low growth firms, the optimal debt level will decrease with the magnitude of MVI when MVI is positive or negative.
A. Empirical Method
To test the above hypothesis, I first develop an econometric method to estimate the marginal volatility of investment. Second, I test HI by cross-sectionally relating those estimates of MVI to firms' leverage ratios.
Estimation of Marginal Volatlltty of Investment (MVI)
In a multi-period setting, equation (1) This would be consistent with product markets, for example, in which good sales this period may likely be followed by good sales next period because the product is superior, or has been inarketed successfully.
'A firm's real investment expenditures also include advertising and R&D expenses, however, data for advertising and R&D expenses are missing fw 80% of the sample. I tise an accounting measure of eamings because it is mne directly related to investment decisions than stock price. Stock price reflectsthepresemvalueof all the expected future cash flows, and its volatility would be much noisier than the volatility of cash flows. Moreover, stock prices are directly inSuenced by the financing decision, which may induce spurious correlation between leverage ratio and MVI in the regression analysis.
Ideally, one would like to obtain estimates of the parameter vector fi for individual firms. In the GMM analysis, I estimate four parameters by fitting a nonlinear mean function and a linear volatility function as described above. For nonlinear models, the individual f-test for each parameter is only asymptotically valid. Tiius, it requires a large number of data points to get reliable estimates, but the amount of individual firm data is insufBcient for this task.
Tb circumvent this data problem, I pool firms into industry groups based on dieir SIC codes. This method of grouping is reasonable for diree reasons. First, firms in the same industry are likely to have similar cash fiow dynamics because they tend to have similar technologies. Second, firms in the same industry are subject to similar economic shocks that may affect the risk-return structure of the investments. Third, investment opportunity sets are similar for firms within die same industry. If a rislqr project with positive NPV appears in a particular industry, all firms in the industry are able to invest in the projea and shift risk. Hence, the marginal volatility of investment is likely similar for firms within the same industry.
Other Factors Affecting Rnandng Policies
The primary focus of the empirical analysis is to examine the model's prediction on how the optimal capital structure is related to the marginal volatility of investment. It is important, howevo', to control for competing explanations of debt policy. Omitting odier detnminants of capital structure from the specification would bias the estimates. In addition, without controlling for those factors, it is possible that the estimates of MVI would not really test the model but instead proxy for other explanatory variables for capital structure, such as a firm's business risk. Furthermore, including control variables allows determination of the relative contribution of the MVI variable to the firm's debt policy.
The previous literature provides useful precedents for selecting proxy variables. According to Harris and Raviv (1991) , it has been well documented diat leverage increases with tangibility of assets and firm size. Leverage decreases with non-debt tax shields, volatility, growth opportunities, and the probability of bankruptcy. I include a number of such variables in the cross-sectional regressions. 
B. Data

C. Empirical Results
Parameter Estimates from GMM Analysis
There are 54 two-digit SIC industries that meet the sample restrictions, and all parameter estimates converge successfully in the estimation procedure. Table  2 presents Table 2 The logsize and market-to-book ratios of tbese two groups are not significantly different. Positive MVI firms, bowever, are systematically different from negative MVI firms in other respects. Positive MVI firms have significantly higher eamings volatility (at the 1% level), but significantly fewer tangible assets and non-debt tax shields (at the 1% level), and significantly lower book leverage ratios (at the 1% level). The lower proportions of tangible assets in positive MVI firms is consistent with the fact that tangible assets can serve as collateral, thereby reducing the firm's risk-shifting incentive as measured by MVI. Because of the risk-shifdng incentive, positive MVI firms have, as expected, higher levels of business risk than negative MVI firms. The differences between the two groups '"Additional tests (» heterogeneity of MVI eatimaies across firms and industries will be preseiued aod discussed in Section m.C.S. suggest that it is important to control for these variables in order to examine the relationship between leverage and MVI.
Regression Analysis
Hypothesis HI suggests a differential relationship between leverage and the marginal volatility of investment conditional on firms' growth opportunities, ib test HI, I partition the sample into high and low growth firms. I follow Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (19%) and use the growth rate of capital expenditures as a growth measure.'' The three-year growth rate of capital expenditures is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures in year +3 to the capital expenditures in year 0, minus one. Firms are ranked according to their average three-year growth rates of capital expenditures over the sample period. One-third of the firms with the highest growth rate of capital expenditures is categorized as "high growth," and one-third with the lowest growth rate of capital expenditures is categorized as "low growth."'B y construction, the differences in the three-year growth rate of capital expenditures between the high and low growth samples are dramatic. As Tkble 4 shows, the average three-year growth rate of capital expenditures is 2.6737 for the high growth sample and -0.2366 for the low growth sample, and the differMcConnell and Servaes (1995). I avoid using the book-to-maricct ratio as a grosvth measure for dividing the sample into high and low giowth firms. Sampling on book-to-maricet ratio before Ktimating the regression with the seme variable violates the assumption of OLS r^ressions.
''^Results cf tests using the top and bottom quaitiles of the giowth classification are more supponive of Hypothesis HI than the three-group resulLs. ence is highly significant, I also constmct three altemative growth measures of Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996) ; the one-year growth rate of c^tal expenditures (CAPXl), and one-year and three-year growth rate of employment (EMPl and EMP3). These measures are all significantiy higher for the high growth sample. In contrast, the high growth sample has a significantiy lower proportion of tangible assets (TANG), which accords well with the negative relation of asset tangibility and growth opportunities. In addition, the risk-shifting incentive as measured by the MVI is significantiy higher for the high growth sample than for the low growth sample. This finding is consistent with the idea that firms with low growth potential and high levels of tangible assets are less likely to shift risk. Tiiis is because risk-shifting is more easily monitored by debt holders in these firms. TsOe 4 rsportB charactarWIc dWerencaa tiatwesn Bamplra daBtifled hto high and low gnmth flrms according to the following growth maaauras. Hssts and WllcGxon slgned^ank tests are used to examlna tha dinarenco cf means and msdena tMtvveen the t«n groups raapectlvely.
CAPX3: three-year gniwth rate of capital axpendltures, which l8 the ratio c( capital axpendbjrse in yaar+3 to the capital expsrKlbjrsa in year 0. minus cna.
CAPX1: one-year gniwlh rats cf capital expendltms. which la the ratic cl caplal expendturss In year 4-1 to the capital expendlturee In year 0. minua era. EMP3: threo yoar growth rate cf employment, which la the ratio cf employment fri year +3 to the emptoymant In year 0, minus one.
Bff>l: one-year growth rate ot employment, which Is the radc of emptcyment in year+1tc the anploymerrt In yevO, minus one.
TANQ: plant and equipment as a percentage cf book value of aaeets.
MVI:
industry esthalBscf the marghalvoMlitycflnveatmenL *.**,-slgnlflBsnt et the 10%, 5%. and 1% levels, respectively.
I estimate separate cross-sectional regressions for the high and low growth samples. To control for the characteristic differences between positive and negative MVI firms that are known to explain debt policy, I include logsize, marketto-book, TANG, rrc, and VAR in a regression of the book leverage ratios on estimated MVI. All tests are conducted using a heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix (see White (1980)).
Tiible 5 reports the results of cross-sectional regressions using the time-series mean of each variable by firm. '^ To identify the relative contribution of the risk-'^Running the regression in a single cross-section eliminates the problem of serially correlated erms. The cross-secdonal r^ression preserves the dispersion across firms, but does not exploit any time-series variation in the observations. shifting variable (MVI) to the firm's debt policy, for each sample regressions are carried out without or with the MVI variable. All regressions are highly significant, and have adjusted^R^ of about 30%. For high growth firms, the coefficient for logsize is positive and significant This result suggests that larger firms are more diversified and have lower probability of bankruptcy, thereby adopting more debt in their capital structure. Consistent with the theory of agency cost of debt, the coefficient on the market-to-book ratio is negative and highly significant In addition, asset tangibility (TANG) has a significant efEect with the predicted sign, suggesting that a high fraction of plant and equipment (tangible assets) in the asset base makes high debt level more desirable. However, in contrast to prediction, the coefficient of non-debt tax shields (FFC) is positive and significant at the 1% level.'** The coefficient of earnings volatility (VAR) is negative but insignificant. In the regression including MVI, the risk-shifting variable barely changes the coefficients of those control variables. Most important, as the model predicts, the coefficient on MVI is significandy positive. The magnitude of the coefficients indicates that the leverage efFiEct is also economically consequential. Ilie 25th percentile of the MVI is -1.70, and the 75th percentile is 1.04. According to the regression, an increase in MVI from the 25th to the 75th percentile is associated with an increase in leverage ratio of 2%.
For the low growth sample, HI suggests that the optimal leverage decreases with the absolute value of MVI. To account for the change of the slope term in the linear regression, I estimate the following model. where Di is a dummy variable that equals one for negative MVI firms and zero otherwise, ai and 0q represent the difference in intercept and MVI fector loading between negative and positive MVI firms, respectively. The coefficient of MVI for positive MVI firms is 0f, while the coefficient for negative MVI firms is ^6 + . Table 5 shows that the coefficients of logsize, market-to-book, and TANG are significant and are comparable in magnitude and sign to those observed for the high growth sanqile. However, ITC has a negative effect on the leverage ratio significant at the level of 5% in the low growth sample. '^ Interestingly, the coefficient of MVI is negative and significant for positive MVI firms. For negative MVI firms, the coefficient becomes positive and marginally significant at the 10% level. Consistent with HI, this result suggests that for low growth firms, die leverage ratio is negatively related to the absolute value of MVI. '*This is because investment tax credits (ITC) tend to be Mgh when a firm's vahie depends substantially OD tangible assets-in-place. The correlation coefficient of ITC and TANG is 0.27 and significant at the 0.01% level. While the tax theory predicts a n^ative effect of ITC on debt use, the agency iheor>' predicts a positive coefficient for ITC. Thus, the sign of ITC would depend on the tradeoff between these two oppoute effects. A positive coefficient of ITC has been previously documented by Bradley, Janell, and Kim (1984) and MacKie-Mason (1990) .
'^Thiii is becatue the n^ative effect of non-debt tax shields on debt policy would be observed only for firms near tax exhaustion so as to affect firms' marginal tax rale. Firms in the low growth sainple may be more likely near tax exhaustion than those in the high growth sample. 
Tests for Robustness
The empirical results above support the theoretical prediction of the model. However, these results may depend on the specific classification scheme and the variable definitions employed. A particular concern here is whether the threeyear growth rate of capital expenditure is a reasonable proxy for the firm's future investment growth opportunities. To shed light on this question, I try alternative measures of growth oi^portunities, CAPXl, EMP3, andEMPl. Again, I subdivide the sample by top and bottom thirds according to these growth measures, and then estimate regression models separately for the high and low growth firms. The results in Ibble 6 confirm the earlier findings. For high growth firms, the relation between leverage and MVI is positive and significant; for low growth firms, the relation is significantiy negative when MVI is positive and weakly positive when MVI is negative. Furthermore, for bodi the high and low growth samples, the coefficients of MVI are comparable in size to those using CAPX3 as a growth measure as in Table S . 
EMP1
: one-year growth rate of ernplcyment, which Is the ratio otempk)yment in year 4.1 to the empk)yment in year 0 minus cne.
-".-"slgnificam ai the 10%, 5%. and 1% levels, rospectively.
I perform an additional sensitivity test by dividing the sample into three groups according to the firm's price-to-eamings ratio (P/E). The results (not shown) are also consistent with those based upon other classification schemes. Thus, the empirical results appear robust to the choice of a growth measure.
Tests for Heterogeneity of GMM Estimates across Rrms and Industries
Although I have argued above that firms in the same industry are more likely to have similar MVIs than firms in different industries, it is important to ensure that there is no significant heterogeneity of MVI across firms in a given industry. I have attempted to address this issue in the following ways.
First, I estimate equation ( Third, I estimate equation (13) for each three-digit SIC industry. There are 18S industries that meet sample restrictions, and 179 of them survive the estimation procedure. I group these parameter estimates according to their two-digit SIC codes, yielding 33 two-digit SIC industries that have more than one estimate at the three-digit level. Ib measure the heterogeneity of these estimates within a two-digit SIC industry, I compute their standard deviation and range statistics (defined as the maximum minus the minimum) within the same two-digit SIC group. Ilible 7 presents summary statistics on these 33 variability measures. The average standard deviation of the three-digit estimates of MVI within each twodigit SIC industry is 0.61, about one-third the standard deviation of 1.71 across the two-digit SIC industry (see Ikble 2). Average standard deviation of the other three parameter estimates within the tWD-digit SIC industry are one-half or onethird of those across the two-digit SIC industry. Tba average range statistics of the MVI estimates at the three-digit level is 2.S2, whereas the range statistics of MVIs across the two-digit industry is 7.S2. Hie average range statistics of the other GMM estimates within the two-digit SIC industry are also less than half of those across the two-digit SIC industry. These results suggest that there is much less heterogeneity of MVI estimates within the two-digit SIC industry than across the industry, which justifies the use of the estimates at the two-digit SIC level.
IV. Conclusions
By endogenizing a firm's risk policy as part of the investment decision, this paper unifies the analysis of the two debt agency {nnblems, risk-shifting and under-investment. A key finding is that, if the volatility of project cash flows increases with investment scale, risk-shifdng by equity holders will mitigate the under-investment problem. Thus, contrary to conventional views, the total agency cost of debt is not monotonically increasing with leverage. Furthermore, the study suggests a unique relationship between the optimal debt level and the marginal volatility of investment (MVI), which I define as the change of cash flow volatility corresponding to a change of investment scale. For high growth firms, the optimal level of debt increases with the magnitude of MVI when MVI is positive, but declines with the magnitude of MVI when MVI is negative. For low growth firms, the optimal level of debt decreases with the magnitude of MVI for both positive and negative MVI firms. I test the model's predictions using cross-sectional data firom Compustat (1976 Compustat ( -1995 , Empirical findings suj^rt these predictions. For high growth firms, I find a significant positive relationship between leverage and MVI. For low growth firms, I observe a significantly negative relationship between leverage and MVI when MVI is positive, and a weakly positive relationship between the two when MVI is negative.
Despite these positive empirical results, there are several limitations to this study. Pirst. because of the data limitation, I estimate MVI based on the two-digit SIC industry data instead of firm level data. Although it appears that estimates of MVI are more homogeneous within the same industry th^ across industries, MVI could be firm specific like the other control variables used in the regressions. Second, because of die dynamic properties of a firm's investment opportunity set, MVI could be time varying instead of constant over the sample period as I have assumed. Tliird, while I attempt to control for some of the previously identified explanatory variables, it is possible that the estimates of the marginal volatility of im'estment are proxying for some other unidentified fiactors that are related to the leverage ratio in the same way as 1 observed.
Taking derivatives with respect to Jtg on both sides of equation (A-1), I have 
f{h)Co
The second equality follows 6om equation (A-2).
B. Proof of the Dynamic Effect of Leverage (D) on a Firm's Investment
Policy ( '(i^) ), which is dependent on the optimal investment scale, k^, which is in turn related to the unit cost of c^tal, Co. Given that fi'{k) = Co, dk/dCo = l/(p"{k)) < 0. Hence, k^isa decreasing function of Co. When Co is high, i fcg will be low. Since /i(/^) is an increasing function of kg, ii{k^) would be low, and then h = {D-A*(*^))/(<y(*o)) '* positive. Therefore dD'/da > 0, In contrast, when Co is low, Ag and fi{k^) will be high, so A < 0. Thus, a negative
